ABSTRACT Due to the widespread popularity in both academia and industry, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have been used in a wide range of applications starting from intelligent transportation to e-health and itinerary planning. This paper proposes a new decentralized lightweight authentication and key agreement scheme for VANETs. In the proposed scheme, there are three types of mutual authentications: 1) between vehicles; 2) between vehicles and their respective cluster heads; and 3) between cluster heads and their respective roadside units. Apart from these authentications, the proposed scheme also maintains secret keys between roadside units for their secure communications. The rigorous formal and informal security analysis shows that the proposed scheme is capable to defend various malicious attacks. Moreover, the ns-2 simulation demonstrates the practicability of the proposed scheme in VANET environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) is considered as a special type of Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET), which allows the vehicles on roads to form a self-organized network. VANETs provide multiple benefits, such as the in-built warning system which warns the driver about the accidents so that he/she can take quick decisions on the basis of provided information. The vehicles further share the information with each other. It also provides information about traffic congestion at the different roads so that driver can take decision on the basis of this information and can select alternative roads [1] . In summary, VANETs help to improve the road environment, infotainment dissemination, and traffic safety for drivers as well as passengers [2] - [4] . An estimation in [5] reveals that the market for vehicular communications will reach several billions of euros in the coming year. Therefore, considerable research efforts are needed in this field [5] . However, in the absence of security and privacy, an adversary can easily traceability, user anonymity and mutual authentication [8] . Lu and Li [9] surveyed various privacy-preserving authentication (PPA) protocols for VANETs, and provide a comparative study on them. Wasef and Shen [10] proposed an authentication protocol, called the message authentication acceleration (MAAC) protocol in which the revocation checking process is performed. Kim et al. [11] proposed an authentication protocol for V 2V secure communication in VANETs. Later, Wasef and Shen extended the work of [10] in [12] . Both schemes were based on certificate revocation list (CRL).
Lin and Li [13] proposed a cooperative message authentication protocol for VANETs. In this protocol, without the direct involvement of the TA, the vehicle's users can authenticate a bunch of message-signature pairs. Liu et al. [14] provided a proxy-based authentication protocol (PBAS) using distributed computing for VANETs in which proxy vehicles were used to authenticate multiple messages at the same time. Wang et al. [15] also presented a decentralized twofactor lightweight privacy-preserving authentication scheme (2FLIP) for VANETs. 2FLIP uses a certificate authority (CA) and the biological-password to achieve the authentication goals.
Shao et al. [16] presented a new group signature based scheme for V 2V authentication in VANETs. Later, it was proved that their scheme lacks forward and backward security properties, and anti-collision [17] . Jiang et al. [1] replaced the CRL-based schemes with their new scheme, called anonymous batch authentication (ABAH ). Sanchez-Garcia et al. [18] proposed a secure authentication scheme, called On-SiteDriverID, and its application for VANET road authorities, which is based on the already in use Spanish eID smart cards. After that, Sugumar et al. [19] presented a trust-based authentication protocol for cluster-based VANETs. The group signatures based schemes, such as the schemes presented in [10] and [12] suffer from long computation delay as CRL checking takes long time. Therefore, to overcome such problem, Zhu et al. [20] proposed HMAC based authentication scheme for VANETs. Li et al. [21] proposed a framework with preservation and repudiation (ACPN ) for VANETs, which can be used for V 2V and vehicle-to-road side unit (V 2RSU ) authentication.
B. MOTIVATION
The existing security schemes proposed in VANETs in Section I-A are either computationally expensive or insecure against several known attacks. For example, though the scheme [7] is a lightweight decentralized protocol, it is insecure against insider attack, impersonation attacks and session key breaking attack [8] . Also, it fails to preserve user traceability, user anonymity and mutual authentication. Another scheme [18] is not resistant to stolen on-board unit (OBU ) attack. Furthermore, it does not preserve anonymity and untraceability properties. In addition, it does not support dynamic RSU addition phase. To overcome these important security drawbacks and limitations in existing schemes, we propose a novel lightweight decentralized authentication and key agreement protocol for VANETs. The proposed scheme supports the following additional features: 1) dynamic RSU addition after initial deployment, 2) RSU to RSU (RSU2RSU) key establishment, 3) password update by a user of a vehicle at any time locally without contacting the trusted authority, 4) anonymity and untraceability properties, 5) usage of non tamper-resistant device as compared to other schemes [7] , [18] , and 6) formal security analysis. Unlike other existing schemes, the proposed scheme also allows three types of mutual authentications: 1) between vehicles; 2) between vehicles and their respective cluster heads; and 3) between cluster heads and their respective roadside units. In addition, the cluster-based VANET network model is used in the proposed scheme in order to reduce the communication and computation overheads.
C. CONTRIBUTIONS
The major contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
• We propose an efficient lightweight authentication and key agreement protocol for VANETs, which uses only one-way hash functions and bitwise XOR operations.
• We prove the security of the proposed scheme using the formal security analysis under the broadly-used RealOr-Random (ROR) model [22] along with informal security analysis.
• Finally, the practical perspective of the proposed scheme is demonstrated through the ns-2 simulation.
D. STRUCTURE OF THIS PAPER
Section II contains the network and threat models used in the proposed scheme. In Section III, we present a new lightweight authenticated key agreement scheme in VANETs.
In Section IV, we analyze the security of our scheme rigorously through the formal and informal analysis. The performance evaluation of our scheme with other relevant schemes is provided in Section V. The simulation analysis using ns-2 is done in Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper with future directions.
II. SYSTEM MODELS
In this section, we demonstrate the network and attack models used in the proposed scheme.
A. NETWORK MODEL
In Figure 1 , we have shown the network model for the vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), which is used in the proposed scheme. In the given model, we have considered different types of vehicles (Vs), cluster heads (CHs), roadside units (RSUs), application server (AS) and trusted authority (TA). Different types of communications exist in the network, which include: 1) vehicle-to-vehicle (V 2V ); 2) vehicle-to-cluster head (V 2CH ); 3) cluster head-toroadside unit (CH 2RSU ); and 4) roadside unit-to-roadside unit (RSU 2RSU ). The role of the TA is to generate the credentials, such as identities, keys etc., for vehicles, CHs and roadside units. After storing the generated information into the memory of roadside units, they are deployed in the network (on different roadsides). The required information are also stored in the memory of an on-board unit (OBU ) of a vehicle so that this information can be used for the authentication process later. The AS is used to provide support for safety-related applications at the traffic management center and also communicates with RSU s for providing application support [23] . According to the proposed model, the different types of authentication mechanisms are needed for V 2V , V 2CH , CH 2RSU and RSU 2RSU in the network. Note that the cluster-based VANET network model is applied in the proposed scheme to reduce the communication and computation overheads in the network.
B. THREAT MODEL
We follow the well-known Dolev-Yao (DY) threat model [24] in the proposed scheme. Under this model, the communication channel is assumed to be insecure. The nodes communicate among each other using insecure channel [25] . We further assume that the RSU s are semi-trusted. An adversary A can then eavesdrop, modify or delete the exchanged messages during the transmission under the DY threat model. Since the RSU s are semi-trusted, we assume that the secret information of RSU s are stored in tamper-resistant device inside RSU s. However, we assume that the OBU s of vehicles are not equipped with tamper-resistant devices unlike other existing schemes where the OBU s are tamper-resistant. Moreover, A can steal the on-board units of some vehicles, and extract all the stored sensitive information from the memory of OBU s by using the power analysis attacks [26] , [27] as OBU s are non-tamper resistant devices. Finally, TA is assumed to be fully trusted.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
We discuss a new lightweight authentication and key agreement scheme for VANETs. In the proposed scheme, vehicles passing through a cross section and moving together with the same velocity form a cluster. The vehicle which is more strategically placed and can communicate with all vehicles is elected as a cluster head node (CH j ) [28] . Note that, in the proposed scheme, the role of cluster head node is very important. In this paper, the cluster head node is selected similar to the scheme [28] . Bali and Kumar [28] proposed a novel secure clustering for efficient data dissemination between different devices in Vehicular Cyber-Physical Systems (VCPS) environment. In order to achieve better cluster stability, they have suggested only those vehicles are selected as CH s that have high trust values and strong connectivity among them. They have shown that their clustering approach achieves higher clustering efficiency. In addition, to maintain the connectivity among the vehicles at various levels, connecting dominating set (CDS) is also constructed among the vehicles to enhance the performance of their scheme. In our scheme, the selection of the cluster head nodes is based on the existing approach [28] . We assume that there are n roadside units, say R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n and l vehicles in the network, say V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V l . A cluster head CH j is elected from the vehicles present in a cluster using the existing clustering algorithm in VANETs [29] . In our scheme, the vehicles in a cluster authenticate with the other vehicles, and with their corresponding cluster head CH j . A cluster head also authenticates with the nearest roadside unit. The following three types of authentication and key establishment are executed in our scheme:
• Vehicle (V i ) to vehicle (V j ) authentication and key establishment.
• Vehicle (V i ) to cluster head (CH j ) authentication and key establishment
• Cluster head (CH j ) to road-side unit (R k ) authentication and key establishment.
Apart from these authentications, the key establishment between the neighbor RSUs is also done for pairwise symmetric key establishment between them so that they can communicate securely using those established keys. The proposed scheme contains various phases, such as roadside unit registration phase, vehicle registration phase, different authentication and key agreement phases, password update phase and dynamic roadside unit addition phase. We use the current timestamps in order to prevent replay attack. For this reason, it is assumed that all the entities (vehicles, cluster heads and RSU s) are synchronized with their clocks.
The details of the all phases are given given in subsequent subsections. Various notations used in the proposed scheme are given in Table 1 .
Before explaining the phases in detail, we provide the high level description of various phases of our scheme in a flow chart given in Figure 2 . During the roadside unit registration phase, the TA is responsible for generating the credentials for each RSU to be deployed in the network. The TA then stores these credentials in RSU s. For RSU to RSU pairwise key establishment, the TA also generates credentials and stores them in RSU s. In the vehicle registration phase, a user U i of a vehicle V i chooses his/her credentials and sends them to the TA via secure channel. The TA then sends information to V i securely and OBU i of V i stores the credentials in its memory prior to deployment of V i in the network. The authentication and key agreement phase consists of three subphases: 1) vehicle to vehicle (V2V) authentication and key agreement phase, 2) vehicle to cluster head (V2CH) authentication and key agreement phase, 3) cluster head to RSU (CH2RSU) authentication and key agreement phase. Note that one of the vehicles in a cluster is elected as the cluster head node as in [28] . In each subphase, two entities first authenticate each other and establish a secret session key between them only after successful mutual authentication. Using the established session key, the entities then communicate each other securely for future communications. The purpose of the RSU to RSU (RSU2RSU) key establishment phase is that two neighbor RSU s will establish the secret pairwise key between them using their pre-loaded credentials during the roadside unit registration phase, and they can use the established key for their future secure communication. For security reasons, it is preferred to change passwords periodically by the users of the vehicles. The password update phase facilitates the users to change their passwords at any time locally without further contacting the TA.
A. REGISTRATION PHASE
The registrations of roadside units and vehicles are performed as follows.
1) ROADSIDE UNIT REGISTRATION PHASE
Before the RSU s are deployed in VANETs, the trusted authority TA generates 1024-bit long distinct secret keys X and X . The TA then generates unique identities of RSU s, say ID R 1 , ID R 2 , . . . , ID R n and the corresponding pseudo identities RID R 1 , RID R 2 , . . . , RID R n which are generated as
The TA further generates secret key of each R k as x = h(ID TA ||X ). In addition, the TA also generates the time-dependent identities for each R k as TID R k = h(ID TA ||RTS R k ||X ), where RTS R k is the registration timestamp of R k . R k is then given the information {x , RID R k , TID R k }. Note that in our scheme, RID R k is used for cluster head to RSU authentication (Section III-B.3), whereas TID R k is for symmetric key establishment between RSU s (Section III-C).
For RSU 2RSU pairwise key establishment phase in Section III-C, we use the polynomial-based key distribution scheme proposed by Blundo et al. [30] . For this purpose, the TA first selects a bivariate polynomial and stores those credentials in its memory prior to its deployment.
over a finite field (Galois field) GF(p) of degree t, where the co-efficients a i,j 's are in GF(p). Note that the prime p is chosen large. For example, P(x, y) = x +y +3xy+ 5x 2 + 5y 2 + 3x 2 y 2 over GF (7) is symmetric as P(y, x) = y+ x+ 3yx+ 5y 2 + 5x 2 + 3y 2 x 2 = P(x, y). For each deployed RSU , say R k , the TA computes the polynomial share P(TID R k , y), which is a univariate polynomial of degree t whose co-efficients are from GF(p). R k is also loaded with P(TID R k , y) in its memory.
If (t +1) or more shares of P(x, y) are revealed to an adversary, he/she can easily reconstruct P(x, y) uniquely using Lagrange's interpolation [31] , [32] . Thus, the disclosure of up to t shares does not reveal the polynomial P(x, y) to an adversary and non-compromised shared keys based on P(x, y) remains completely secure. As a result, t is also taken large (for example, we can take the value of t as t = 5000), which is much larger than the number of RSU s deployed in VANETs to preserve unconditional security and t-collusion resistant property [33] , [34] .
Note that each R k is given the information {x , RID R k , TID R k , P(TID R k , y)} prior to its deployment in VANETs.
2) VEHICLE REGISTRATION PHASE
To start the secure communication with other vehicles, cluster head and roadside units, the offline registration of each vehicle happens at the TA. Since the vehicle registration is one-time process, this phase is executed via a secure channel (for example, in person). This phase has the following steps:
Step 1: The user U i of a vehicle V i first chooses a unique identity ID i and password PW i by his/her choice, and two 160-bit random secrets r i and k. The on-board unit OBU i of V i then calculates the masked password RPW i = h(PW i ||r i ) and sends the registration request ID i , (RPW i ⊕ k) to the TA through secure channel.
Step 2: Upon reception of
using the previously generated 1024-bit long secret key X . It further computes
In addition, the TA also generates a unique secret key K V i for each registered vehicle V i and computes the temporal credential Step 3: Upon reception of information in Step 2, OBU i of
Note that the parameter Y is used in case of vehicle to vehicle and vehicle to cluster head authentication and key agreement, whereas the parameter Y is only used in case of cluster head to roadside unit authentication and key agreement.
The summary of vehicle registration phase is shown in Figure 3 .
B. AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
U i first inputs his/her identity ID i and password PW * i in the
. Note that other vehicles also compute same x and x in this way once the authorized users of those vehicles input the correct credentials: identity and password. OBU i checks if A * 4 = A 4 . It the condition does not hold, this phase terminates immediately. Otherwise, it implies that U i provides the correct identity and password information, and U i is considered as a valid user of the vehicle V i . In addition, OBU i also calculates TC V i = TC V i ⊕ RPW * i .
1) V2V AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
In this phase, two neighbor vehicles, say V i and V j in each cluster perform the following steps:
Step 1: OBU i of V i chooses a random nonce r 1 and generates the current timestamp T 1 , and computes time-dependent secret key K x 1 = h(x ||T 1 ) using previously computed x.
Note the x and x are used for authentication between two neighbor vehicles in a cluster, and the cluster head and nearest RSU in VANETs, respectively. OBU i further calculates
, and sends authentication request message M 1 , M 2 , T 1 to its neighbor vehicle V j via open channel.
Step 2: Upon receiving M 1 , M 2 , T 1 , OBU j of V j verifies the timeliness of T 1 by checking condition |T 1 − T * 1 | ≤ T , where T is the maximum transmission delay and T * 1 is the time when the message is received. If it satisfies, OBU j computes time-dependent secret key K x 1 = h(x ||T 1 ) using the received timestamp T 1 and previously computed x. It then calculates
. OBU j further checks the condition M 3 = M 2 . If it matches, V i is authenticated by V j ; otherwise, the authentication process is stopped by V j immediately.
Step 3: OBU j chooses a random nonce r 2 and current timestamp T 2 , and computes time-dependent secret key
, and then sends the
Step 4: Upon receiving M 4 , M 5 , T 2 , OBU i also checks the timeliness of T 2 by condition |T 2 − T * 2 | ≤ T , where T * 2 is the reception time of the message. If it satisfies, OBU i computes K x 2 = h(x|| T 2 ) using the received timestamp T 2 and previously computed x, and
. It then checks the condition M 6 = M 5 . If it matches, V j is successfully authenticated by V i . OBU i again chooses current timestamp T 3 and computes M 7 = h(SK V i ,V j ||T 3 ), and finally sends an acknowledgment message M 7 , T 3 to V j via open channel.
Step 5: After receiving M 7 , T 3 , OBU j checks the timeliness of T 3 by checking condition
is the reception time of the message. Then, it computes M 8 = h(SK V i ,V j ||T 3 ) and checks whether M 8 = M 7 . If it matches, the computed session key by OBU i is correct, and ensures that both V i and V j establish the same common session key
This phase is summarized in Figure 4 .
2) V2CH AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
A vehicle V i and its cluster head CH j in each cluster perform following steps:
Step 1: OBU i of V i first selects a random nonce r V i and current timestamp T 1 , and then calculates K x 1 = h(x|| T 1 ) using previously computed x. It further calculates Step 2: Upon receiving message, CH j verifies the timeliness of T 1 . If it satisfies, on-board unit of
If it matches, V i is authenticated by CH j ; otherwise, CH j stops the authentication process immediately.
Step 3: OBU CH j then chooses a random nonce r CH j and current timestamp T 2 , and calculates the time-dependent key
, and then sends the message M 4 
Step 4: 
3) CH2RSU AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
The cluster head CH j and its nearby roadside unit R k perform following steps:
Step 1: OBU CH j of CH j chooses a random nonce r CH j and timestamp T 1 , and calculates the time-dependent key 
K x
Step 2: Upon receiving M 1 , M 2 , T 1 , R k verifies the timeliness of T 1 . If it satisfies, R k computes the time-dependent key K x 1 = h(x ||T 1 ) using the received T 1 . It then calculates
, CH j is authenticated by R k ; otherwise, the authentication process is immediately terminated by R k .
Step 3: R k then chooses a random nonce r R k and current timestamp T 2 and computes another time-dependent key
, and sends the message M 4 , M 5 , T 2 to CH j via open channel.
Step 4: Upon receiving M 4 , M 5 , T 2 , OBU CH j also verifies the timeliness of T 2 . If it is valid, OBU CH j computes the time-dependent key K x 2 = h(x ||T 2 ) using the received T 2 and Step 5: After receiving M 7 , T 3 , R k checks the timeliness of T 3 . If it is valid, R k computes M 8 = h(SK CH j ,R k ||T 3 ) and checks whether M 8 = M 7 . If it matches, the computed session key by OBU CH j is correct, and it also ensures that both CH j and R k establish the same session key SK CH j ,R k (= SK CH j ,R k ) for secure communication.
This phase is further summarized in Figure 5 .
C. RSU2RSU KEY ESTABLISHMENT PHASE
For pairwise key establishment between two neighbor RSU s, say R u and R v , the following steps are executed:
Step 1: R u generates a random nonce r u and sends the message TID R u , r u to R v .
Step 2: After receiving TID R u , r u , R v computes the symmetric key shared with R u as SK R u ,R v = P(TID R v , TID R u ) using its pre-loaded polynomial share P (TID R v , y) and SKV = h(SK R u ,R v ||r u ). R v then sends the message TID R v , SKV to R u .
Step 3: Finally, after receiving TID R v , SKV , R u computes the symmetric key shared with R v as SK R u ,R v = P(TID R u , TID R v ) (= SK R u ,R v ) using its pre-loaded polynomial share P(TID R u , y) and SKV = h(SK R u ,R v ||r u ) using its own previously generated random nonce r u . Furthermore, R u checks if SKV = SKV . If the condition holds, it guarantees that both R u and R v share the same symmetric key for their future secure communication.
D. PASSWORD UPDATE PHASE
In the proposed scheme, OBU i of the vehicle V i can update password after the registration phase without using a verification table and connecting to the remote system. To improve the security of a system, it is necessary to change the passwords periodically by the legal users after the registration phase. This phase helps a legal user U i of the vehicle V i to update current password by a new password with the help of the following steps:
Step 1: U i provides identity ID i and old password PW old i . Step 2: OBU i asks U i to provide a new password PW new i . , y)} prior to its deployment in VANETs.
OBU i then computes r
* i = B i ⊕ h(PW old i ||ID i ), A * 1 = A 1 ⊕ h(ID i || r * i ), RPW old i = h(PW old i ||r * i ), ID * TA = ID TA ⊕ h(ID i ||r * i ), RID * i = RID i ⊕ h(PW old i ||ID i ||r * i ), A * 2 = h(RID * i || A * 1 || ID * TA ), A old 3 = h(ID i ||
After that it computes RID
* * i = RID * i ⊕ h(PW new i ||ID i ||r * i ), TC * V i = TC V i ⊕ RPW old i , TC * * V i = TC * V i ⊕ h(PW new i ⊕ r * i ), B new i = h(PW new i ||ID i )⊕ r * i , RPW new i = h(PW new i ||r * i ), A new 3 = h(ID i || RPW new i ||ID * TA ||A * 1 ), A new 4 = h(A new 3 ||A * 2 ), Y * = Y ⊕ (RPW old i ⊕ RPW new i ) = x⊕ A 2 ⊕ RPW new i and Y * * = Y ⊕ (RPW old i ⊕ RPW new i ) = x ⊕ A 2 ⊕ RPW new i .
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, through the formal security analysis using the broadly-used Real-Or-Random (ROR) model [22] and informal security analysis, we show that the proposed scheme is secure against various known attacks.
A. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS USING REAL-OR-RANDOM MODEL
The Real-Or-Random (ROR) model is applied in formal security proof of the proposed scheme as in [35] and [36] . Under this model, we show that the proposed scheme provides the session-key security.
We have three main participants, namely vehicle V i , cluster head CH j (which is one of the vehicles in a cluster) and RSU R k . The ROR model [22] has the following components:
and v R k be the instances t, u and v of V i , CH j and R k , respectively, which are called as the oracles.
Accepted state. An instance t is in the accepted state, if upon receiving the last expected protocol message, it goes into an accept state. The ordered concatenation of all communicated sent and received messages by t forms the session identification (sid) of t for the current session [37] .
Partnering. Two instances t 1 and t 2 are called partnered if the following three conditions are fulfilled: 1) both t 1 and t 2 are in accept state; 2) both t 1 and t 2 mutually authenticate each other and share identical session identification (sid); and 3) t 1 and t 2 are mutual partners of each other [37] .
Freshness. If an adversary A does not derive the session key between any two communicating parties using the reveal query, RL( t ) given below, t
Adversary. A can have fully control over all the communications. Thus, A has the ability to read and modify all exchanged messages, and even can fabricate new messages and also inject them in the network. Apart from this, A can have access to the following queries as presented in [35] :
A executes this query in order to obtain the messages exchanged between two honest participants. This is modeled as an eavesdropping attack.
• RL( t ): This query reveals the current session key generated by t (and its partner) to an adversary A.
• SN ( t , msg): This query is executed by A in order to transmit a message, say msg to a participant instance t and also receives a response message. This is modeled as an active attack.
It models V i 's or CH j 's OBU stolen attack. It can extract all the information stored in OBU of V i or CH j .
• Test( t ): It models the semantic security of the session key SK following the indistinguishability in ROR model [22] . At the beginning of the experiment, a coin c is flipped and then its output is only known to A. It helps to determine the output of the Test query. If A executes this query, and also SK is fresh, t outputs SK in case c = 1 or a random number in the same domain when c = 0; otherwise, it outputs a null value (⊥). Semantic security of the session key. In the ROR model, A's task is to distinguish between an instance's real session key and a random key. AS ≤ ψ, for a sufficiently small real number ψ > 0. Random oracle. As in [35] , all the participants including A will have access to a collision-resistant one-way cryptographic hash function h(·), which is also modeled as a random oracle, say H.
The security proof given in Theorem 1 is similar to that presented in [35] . Note that Theorem 1 presents the the semantic security of the proposed authentication scheme for breaking the session key security between a cluster head CH j and an RSU R k . Similarly, the the semantic security of the proposed authentication scheme for breaking the session key security between two neighbor vehicles, and between a vehicle and its cluster head can be proved as in Theorem 1. Proof: As in [35] and [36] , we define a sequence of four games, say G i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3). We denote Win i as an event wherein the bit c in the game G i can be successfully guessed by A. The detailed description of these games are given below. (1) 
Game
||T 2 ). On the other hand, the same session key is also derived by CH j . The session key involves the long-term secrets x , RID CH j , TC CH j , RID R k and ID * TA as well as temporary secrets r CH j and r R k . The chance of winning G 1 by A is not increased by eavesdropping the messages 5 , T 2 and Msg 3 = M 7 , T 3 in order to derive the session key. Hence, we get,
Game G 2 : In this game, we add the simulations of the Send and H oracles, where G 2 is modeled as an active attack. A tries to deceive a participant in the network into accepting a modified message. A is allowed to query several H oracle to verify if there is any collision in hash outputs. Note that each of messages Msg 1 , Msg 2 and Msg 3 is associated to a participant's pseudo identity, temporary random secrets, long-term secrets as well as timestamps. Thus, even if A makes the SN oracle queries, there will no collision. Applying the birthday paradox, we have,
Game G 3 : This is the final game, which simulates the CorruptOBU query. Note that A can extract the information
However, these information do not help in deriving the session key SK CH j ,R k as it needs the secrets x , RID CH j , TC CH j , RID R k and ID TA and these are protected by h(·). It is also difficult to calculate x from Y without correct password PW i of user of CH j and A 2 using the password dictionary attack. If the system allows a limited number of wrong password inputs, we get,
Since all the random oracles are simulated except that the adversary A needs to guess the bit c to win the game after querying the Test oracle, we get,
From Equation (1), we have,
With the help of the triangular inequality, we have, As a result, equations (2) and (6) yield
Finally, from equations (6) and (7), we get,
B. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
We also analyze the security of the proposed scheme informally and show that the proposed scheme has the ability to protect the following well-known attacks.
1) REPLAY ATTACK
In the proposed, during the authentication and key agreement for V 2V , V 2CH and CH 2RSU , the messages
, T 2 and Msg 3 = M 7 , T 3 involve the timestamps T 1 , T 2 and T 3 , respectively. Therefore, even if an adversary intercepts and replays these messages later, validation of the attached timestamps will fail. Thus, these messages will be treated as old messages only. Hence, our scheme is secure against replay attack.
2) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
Consider the V 2V authentication in the proposed scheme. There are three messages
, T 2 and Msg 3 = M 7 , T 3 involve during this phase. Suppose an adversary A intercepts the message Msg 1 and tries to modify this message to create a valid message. For this purpose, A can generates a random nonce r 1a and current timestamp T 1a . Then, A can not calculate K x 1a = h(x|| T 1a ) as the secret key x is unknown to him/her. This means that A can not further compute
) without having other secrets RID i , TC V i and ID TA . Thus, A can not modify Msg 1 . In a similar way, A can not also modify other two messages Msg 2 and Msg 3 . Using the similar argument, it can be also shown that A does not have ability to modify the messages for V 2CH as well as CH 2RSU authentication and key agreement in the proposed scheme too. This clearly indicates that the proposed scheme provides the man-in-themiddle attack protection.
3) STOLEN OBU, PRIVILEGED-INSIDER AND OFFLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACKS
Assume that the OBU i of a vehicle is stolen by an adversary A. According to the threat model (Section II-B) , 4 , h(·)} stored in OBU i using the power analysis attacks [26] , [27] as the OBU i is not tamper resistant. Without having the secret X , it is computationally difficult task for A to derive ID i from RID i . Also, without random secret r i and ID i , it is difficult job for A to guess the password PW i of a legal user U i using the offline password guessing attack.
Furthermore, we assume that an insider user of the TA knows the registration information ID i and RPW i ⊕ k during the vehicle registration phase. Even if the information extracted from the stolen OBU i are known to the insider user later after registration phase, he/she is still unable to derive the secrets PW i , x and x . This shows that the proposed scheme resists the stolen OBU, privileged-insider as well as offline password guessing attacks.
4) STOLEN VERIFIER ATTACK
In the proposed scheme, the OBU i of a vehicle V i stores the information
Assume that these information are stolen by an adversary A. However, the secrets PW i , x, x , ID TA and ID i are protected by the one-way hash function h(·). Collision resistant property of h(·) ensures that the secrets PW i , x, x , ID TA and ID i can not be derived or guessed correctly by A. In addition, the proposed scheme does not store any verifier table to check the entered credentials of a user U i associated with a vehicle V i . Hence, the proposed scheme is secure against stolen verifier attack.
5) IMPERSONATION ATTACKS
To impersonate a vehicle during the V 2V authentication, an attacker A needs to create a valid message Msg 1 = M 1 , M 2 , T 1 . To do so, A requires the secret x. Even if A generates its own random nonce and timestamp, he/she is unable to calculate M 1 and M 2 as the secrets x, RID i , TC V i , and ID TA are unknown. Also A can not create valid messages Msg 2 = M 4 , M 5 , T 2 and Msg 3 = M 7 , T 3 . Similarly, A can not also impersonate the cluster head and RSU during the vehicle to cluster head and cluster head to RSU authentication phases. Thus, our scheme is secure against vehicle (user), cluster head and RSU impersonation attacks.
6) ANONYMITY
During the V 2V , V 2CH and CH 2RSU authentication phase, the messages
and Msg 3 = M 7 , T 3 do not involve the identities of a user (vehicle) and RSU . Furthermore, from these eavesdropped messages, it is computationally infeasible task for an adversary to derive the identities of a user (vehicle) and RSU as these are protected by encryption and one-way hash function. The proposed scheme thus preserves the anonymity property.
7) UNTRACEABILITY
During the V 2V , V 2CH and CH 2RSU authentication phase, each session follows three messages
constructed using random nonce and the pseudo identity of a vehicle. Thus, M 1 , and also M 2 are distinct for each session as the random nonce and timestamp are involved in M 2 . Similarly, M 4 and M 5 are constructed using random nonce and the pseudo identity of a cluster head or RSU . Furthermore, M 7 is also constructed using the current timestamp. As a result, all these messages are distinct in each session, and an adversary can not trace a vehicle or RSU . Hence, the proposed scheme preserves the untraceability property.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section compares the communication and computation overheads, and functionality features among the proposed scheme and other most relevant schemes in VANETs, such as Chuang-Lee's scheme [7] and Sanchez-Garcia et al.'s scheme [18] .
A. SECURITY AND FUNCTIONALITY FEATURES COMPARISON
The comparison of security and functionality features of the proposed scheme, Chuang-Lee's scheme [7] and SanchezGarcia et al.'s scheme [18] are provided in Table 2 . ChuangLee's scheme [7] is not resistant to impersonation attacks, stolen OBU attack, privileged insider attack and offline password guessing attack. In addition, it does not preserve anonymity and untraceability properties and mutual authentication, and also lacks dynamic RSU addition phase. SanchezGarcia et al.'s scheme [18] is not resistant to stolen OBU attack. Furthermore, it does not preserve anonymity and untraceability properties. In addition, it does not support dynamic RSU addition phase. In both Chuang-Lee's scheme and Sanchez-Garcia et al.'s scheme, OBU s are tamper-proof devices, whereas in our scheme the OBU s as the non-tamper proof devices. We have also provided the formal security using the random oracle model to prove the security of our scheme, whereas other two existing schemes do not have the formal security analysis.
B. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON
The communication costs of the existing schemes and our scheme are compared in Table 3 . We have assumed that the pseudo identity is 160 bits (as it is derived using hash function); random nonce is 128 bits; timestamp is 32 bits; hash digest is 160 bits (if we use SHA-1 as hash function [38] , [39] ). Note that for more security, one can also use SHA-256 as hash function [39] . By considering these values, the communication costs for our scheme, Chuang-Lee's scheme [7] and Sanchez-Garcia et al.'s scheme [18] become 896 bits, 1440 bits, and 6722 bits, respectively.
In the authentication and key establishment phase of our scheme, the messages
= 352 bits, (160 +160 +32) = 352 bits and (160 +32) = 192 bits, respectively. As a result, the total communication cost of the proposed scheme for V2V or V2CH or CH2RSU authentication phase turns out to be (352+ 352+ 192) = 896 bits. In Sanchez-Garcia et al.'s scheme, we have considered 1024-bit RSA cryptosystem, where each encryption/decryption block size is 1024 bits. Our scheme is efficient as it takes less communication cost as compared to other schemes.
C. COMPUTATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON
In Table 4 , the notations T E /T D and T H are used for computational time for an encryption/decryption using public key cryptographic technique (such as RSA algorithm) and a cryptographic one-way hash function h(·), respectively. Since the computation time taken by a bitwise XOR operation is negligible, we have neglected it from the performance evaluation.
The existing experimental values of the various operations provided in [40] and [41] are considered for T E /T D and T H , which are 0.0192s and 0.00032s, respectively. Note that it is assumed that T E /T D is equal to the time taken for a modular exponentiation operation, and therefore, it is taken as 0.0192s. The computation costs of our scheme and existing schemes are compared in Table 4 . The total computation cost for our scheme is 24T H ≈ 7.68ms, which is less than that for Sanchez-Garcia et al.'s scheme. Though the computation cost of our scheme is little more than that for Chuang-Lee's scheme, our scheme is more secure than that scheme, and it also provides extra functionality features as comapred to Chuang-Lee's scheme, which are shown in Table 2 .
VI. PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE: NS2 SIMULATION STUDY
In this section, the practical perspective of the proposed scheme, Chuang-Lee's scheme [7] and Sanchez-Garcia et al.'s scheme [18] is discussed through the NS2 simulation.
A. SIMULATION PARAMETERS
The proposed scheme and other related schemes [7] , [18] are simulated on Ubuntu 14.04 LTS platform using the NS2 2.35 simulator [42] . The values of various network parameters used in the simulations are listed in Table 5 . The simulation time is 1800 seconds (30 minutes). V i , dVeh, CH j , LE j and aVehs represent i th vehicle, i th driving vehicle, j th cluster head, j th law executor and authority vehicle in the existing schemes [7] , [18] . We have taken the three different types of mobility, i.e., 20, 40 and 60 kilometers per hour (kmph) for CH j /LE j /aVeh/V i /dVeh. Moreover, we have taken five RSU s for all scenarios wherever it is applicable.
B. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENTS
We have three different network simulation scenarios. In each scenario, we have three authentication and key agreement messages.
• Scenario 1. It consists of five CH j /LE j /aVehs and 45 V i /dVehs.
• Scenario 2. It consists of five CH j /LE j /aVehs and 70 V i /dVehs.
• Scenario 3. It consists of five CH j /LE j /aVehs and 95 V i /dVehs.
The messages exchanged between the entities and their communication costs in bits for various schemes provided in Table 6 are used in the simulation study.
C. DISCUSSION ON SIMULATION RESULTS
Various network performance parameters, such as throughput (in bps), end-to-end delay (in seconds) and packet delivery ratio are computed during the simulation, which are further given in detail below. 
1) IMPACT ON THROUGHPUT
Throughput is calculated as the number of bits transmitted per unit time. The throughput (in bps) of the proposed scheme under three scenarios is shown in Figure 6 . The throughput can be computed as (n r × n pkt )/T d , where T d is the total time (in seconds), n pkt the size of a packet, and n r the total number of received packets. Note that we have considered the simulation time as 1800 seconds, which is the total time. In our scheme, the scenarios 1, 2 and 3 have the throughput values as 35.18 bps, 50.58 bps and 65.10 bps, respectively.
The throughput values increase with the number of increasing vehicles because more number of vehicles interact among each other and also with the cluster heads, and as a result, the number of exchanged messages is high from scenarios 1 to 2, and also from scenarios 2 to 3. Moreover, we have compared the throughput of our scheme with that for the schemes of Chuang-Lee [7] and Sanchez-Garcia et al. [18] . Throughput of our scheme is less than the schemes of Chuang-Lee [7] and Sanchez-Garcia et al. [18] . This is because our scheme is efficient and it needs less communication cost due to small sized messages used for authentication as compared to other schemes (see Table 6 ). 
FIGURE 7.
Comparison of end-to-end delays among different schemes.
FIGURE 8.
Comparison of packet delivery ratios among different schemes.
2) IMPACT ON END-TO-END DELAY
The end-to-end delay (EED) is derived as the average time taken by data packets to arrive at a destination from a source. Figure 7 shows EED of our scheme under scenarios 1, 2 and 3. Mathematically, EED can be expressed as
where T rec i and T send i are the receiving and sending time of a packet i, respectively, and n p the total number of packets. In the proposed scheme, EEDs are 0.09451s, 0.22400s and 0.43083s for the network scenarios 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Note that the value of EED increases with the increasing number of vehicles. This happens because the increment in the number of vehicles causes more exchanged messages that further incurs congestion, and thus, the EED increases from scenario 2 to scenario 3. We have also compared the EED values of our scheme with those for the schemes of Chuang-Lee and Sanchez-Garcia et al. The EED of our scheme is comparable with that for the schemes of Chuang-Lee and Sanchez-Garcia et al.
3) IMPACT ON PACKET DELIVERY RATIO
The packet delivery ratio (PDR) is the ratio of total packets sent to total packets received. PDR of our scheme under scenarios 1, 2 and 3 is shown in Figure 8 . PDRs of our scheme are 0.93, 0.89 and 0.86 for scenarios 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Note that PDR decreases with increasing number of vehicles from scenario 1 to scenario 2, and also from scenario 2 to scenario 3. This is because in case of more number of vehicles, more messages are exchanged, and hence, it causes congestion in the network. In addition, we have compared PDR of our scheme with the schemes of Chuang-Lee and Sanchez-Garcia et al. The PDR of our scheme is also comparable with that for the existing schemes.
VII. CONCLUSION
We present a new lightweight authentication and key agreement protocol for VANETs. The proposed scheme is efficient as it uses only one-way hash functions and bitwise XOR operations. The security analysis of the proposed scheme depicts that it is secure against various known attacks, and also provides additional functionality features, such as efficient dynamic RSU addition phase, mutual authentication, vehicles (cluster heads) and RSUs anonymity property, and untraceability property. The performance analysis of the proposed scheme shows that the proposed scheme is lightweight and incurs low computation cost and communication cost. The practical demonstration is also done using the ns2 simulation for various network parameters. Therefore, the proposed scheme is suitable for the deployment in the next generation VANETs based applications such as intelligent transportation, e-healthcare and smart ecosystems. 
